Socially Efficient Discounting under Ambiguity Aversion by Gierlinger, Johannes & Gollier, Christian
Socially efficient discounting under ambiguity
aversion
Christian Gollier
Toulouse School of Economics (LERNA and EIF)
Johannes Gierlinger1
Toulouse School of Economics (LERNA)
November 3, 2008
1This research benefitted from the financial support of the Chair "Sustainable fi-
nance and responsible investment" at TSE. Correspondence: Toulouse School of
Economics, Manufacture des Tabacs, Aile J.-J. Laffont, MF007, 21 allée de Brienne,
31000 Toulouse, France. Email: johannes.gierlinger@univ-tlse1.fr
Abstract
We consider an economy with an ambiguity-averse representative agent who
faces an uncertain consumption growth. We examine the condition under which
ambiguity aversion reduces the socially efficient discount rate. We show that
ambiguity aversion affects the interest rate in two ways. The first effect is an
ambiguity prudence effect similar to the prudence effect that prevails in the
expected utility model, but which requires decreasing ambiguity aversion to be
signed. Aversion to ambiguity also entails more pessimism. But this pessimistic
shift in beliefs generally has an ambiguous effect on the interest rate. We provide
sufficient conditions under which ambiguity aversion does indeed decrease the
socially efficient discount rate. The calibration of the model tells us that the
effect of ambiguity aversion on the way we should discount distant cash flows is
potentially large.
Keywords: Decreasing ambiguity aversion, ambiguity prudence, Ramsey
rule, sustainable development.
1 Introduction
The emergence of public policy problems associated with the sustainability of
our development has raised a considerable interest for the determination of a
socially efficient discount rate. This debate has recently culminated in the pub-
lication of two reports about the evaluation of different public investments. On
one side, the Copenhagen Consensus (Lomborg (2004)) put top priority to pub-
lic programs yielding immediate benefits (fighting malaria and AIDS, improving
water supply,...), and rejected the idea to invest much in the prevention of global
warming. On the other side, the Stern Review (Stern (2007)) put tremendous
pressure on acting quickly and heavily against global warming. Because global
warming will really affect our economies in a relatively distant time horizon,
the choice of the rate at which these costs are discounted plays a key role in
reaching either conclusion. While Stern applies an implicit rate of 1.4% per
year, the Copenhagen Consensus argues that an efficient rate should be around
5%. For the sake of illustrating the power of discounting, consider a project
which yields its benefits in t years time. For a horizon t = 100 the Copenhagen
Consensus would require a rate-of-return already 36 times higher than Stern.
As stated by the well-known Ramsey rule (Ramsey (1928)), the socially
efficient discount rate (net of the rate of pure preference for the present) is equal
to the product of relative risk aversion and the growth rate of consumption. The
basic idea is that, given the assumption that one will be wealthier in the future,
one is willing to improve future wealth by sacrificing current wealth only if
the return of this investment is large enough to compensate for the increased
intertemporal inequality that this investment generates. If we assume that the
growth rate of wealth is 2% and relative risk aversion equals 2, this yields a
discount rate of 4%.
However, if one wants to use this kind of idea to value investments affecting
distant generations, it is crucial to take into account of the riskiness affecting the
long term growth of consumption. Hansen and Singleton (1983), Gollier (2002)
and Weitzman (2007a), among others, have extended the Ramsey rule by as-
suming an exogenously given stochastic process for the growth of the economy.
This adds a precautionary term to the Ramsey rule which tends to reduce the
discount rate in order to induce more investment for the future. The convexity
of the prudent representative agent’s marginal utility implies that the uncer-
tainty about future consumption raises the expected marginal utility, i.e. the
willingness to save for the future (Leland (1968), Drèze and Modigliani (1972)).
This reduces the interest rate.
The present paper goes one step further in this analysis by recognizing that
there is some degree of uncertainty on the stochastic process affecting the long-
term growth of the economy. Such parameter uncertainty on priors is typically
referred to as statistical ambiguity or Knightian uncertainty. We believe that
this assumption is a realistic one, especially for long-term forecasts. Departing
from the standard Subjective Expected Utility (SEU, Savage (1954)), we also
assume that the representative agent is ambiguity-averse, i.e., that she dislikes
mean-preserving spreads over prior beliefs. Indeed, starting with the pioneering
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work by Ellsberg (1961), ample evidence in favor of this hypothesis has been
accrued.1 All of which suggests that it is behaviorally meaningful to distinguish
lotteries over prior distributions from lotteries over final outcomes. In what
follows, we will consider a representative agent who displays “smooth ambiguity
preferences”, as recently proposed by Klibanoff, Marinacci and Mukerji (KMM,
2005, 2007), which entails the max-min criterion as a particular case. In the
KMM model, the agent computes the expected utility of future consumption
conditional to each possible value of the uncertain parameter. She then evaluates
her future felicity by computing the certainty equivalent of these conditional
expected utilities using an increasing and concave function φ. The concavity of
this function implies that she dislikes any mean-preserving spread in the set of
plausible beliefs, i.e. that she is ambiguity-averse.
In this paper, we address the question of how does ambiguity aversion affect
the socially efficient discount rate. Intuitively, we might expect that it should
raise the agent’s willingness to save in order to compensate for the adverse
effect of ambiguity on future welfare. It turns out, however, that this is not
true in general: ambiguity aversion may increase the socially efficient discount
rate. This is connected to two, possibly opposing, effects of ambiguity aversion
on marginal utilities. On the one hand, there is an ambiguity prudence effect
similar to the prudence effect in the expected utility framework. We show that
the mere uncertainty on the conditional expected utility reduces its φ-certainty
equivalent if and only if φ exhibits decreasing absolute (ambiguity) aversion
(DAAA). This is more demanding than just the convexity of φ0, because the
future felicity is measured by the φ-certainty equivalent rather than by the
expectation of φ.
On the other hand, as observed by KMM (2005, 2007), ambiguity aver-
sion yields an implicit pessimism effect, which acts as if probability weights
were shifted towards more unfavorable prior distributions, in the sense of the
Monotone Likelihood Ratio order (MLR). However, this shift in beliefs does not
in general imply a reduction of the interest rate. We derive pairs of conditions
on the risk attitude and on the stochastic ordering of plausible distributions
which guarantee that, under DAAA, the socially efficient discount rate is lower
than in the ambiguity-neutral benchmark.
This paper is related to Weitzman (2007a) and Gollier (2007b), who also
recognize the uncertainty affecting the growth of the economy as an important
feature of the discounting problem. Weitzman (2007a) shows that the uncer-
tainty affecting the volatility of the growth process may yield a term structure
1The Ellsberg-Paradox refers to the outcome of an experiment (Ellsberg (1961)). In an urn
containing 90 balls there were 30 red balls, and the remaining were either black or yellow in
unknown proportions. Participants had to bet on the color of the ball drawn, receiving a prize
of $100, in case of a successful bet. A large group preferred to bet on drawing red vs. betting
on black. However, in a second stage they preferred to bet on not drawing red vs. betting on
not drawing black. This choice pattern contradicts the hypothesis that participants associated
unique subjective probabilities to each outcome of a draw, as required in the SEU framework.
Note that betting on (or against) red is indeed an unambiguous act with well-defined winning
probabilities, while betting on (or against) black is not. For a survey of the literature consult
e.g. Camerer and Weber (1992).
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of the discount rate that tends to minus infinity for very long time horizons.
Gollier (2007b) provides a typology of more general structures for the paramet-
ric uncertainty and shows that the sign of the third or fourth derivative of the
utility function are necessary to sign the effect of this uncertainty on the efficient
discount rate, depending upon its type. We depart strongly from these works
based on a SEU approach by introducing ambiguity aversion in the preferences
of the representative agent.
Jouini, Napp and Marin (2007) and Gollier (2007a) consider the related
question of how to aggregate diverging beliefs in a SEU framework. Jouini,
Napp and Marin show that an aggregation bias might cause a richer evolution
of the discount rate than in the representative agent models. In particular, the
discount rate might be first increasing and only then approach its limit, namely
the smallest individual rate.
The most active branch of the literature on ambiguous processes deals with
asset pricing. Clearly, the underlying mechanisms are very similar to the ones we
will study below. Methodologically, our paper is most closely related to Gollier
(2006). He investigates comparative statics results of an increase in ambiguity
aversion on the demand for risky assets. It turns out that, in general, omitting
ambiguity aversion cannot be corrected for by assuming a higher degree of risk
aversion.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces
the basic model and presents the equilibrium pricing formula. In Section 3 an
analytical example yields an adapted Ramsey-rule for the interest rate under
ambiguity. We decompose the effect of ambiguity aversion into its two com-
ponents in Section 4, whereas Sections 5 and 6 are devoted to respectively the
ambiguity prudence effect and the pessimism effect. Section 7 investigates un-
der which conditions our findings extend to any increase in ambiguity aversion.
Finally, before concluding, we calibrate the model using two different specifica-
tions in Section 8.
2 The model
We consider an economy à la Lucas (1978). Each agent in the economy is
endowed with a tree which produces ect fruits at date t, t = 0, 1, 2, .... There is
a market for zero-coupon bonds at date 0 in which agents may exchange the
delivery of one fruit today against the delivery of ertt fruits for sure at date t.
Thus, the real interest rate associated to maturity t is rt. The distribution of ect
is a function of a parameter θ that can take values 1, 2, ..., n. This parametric
uncertainty takes the form of a random variable eθ whose probability distribution
is a vector q =(q1, ..., qn), where qθ is the probability that eθ takes value θ. The
cumulative distribution function of ect conditional to θ is denoted Ftθ. The crop
conditional to θ is denoted ectθ. An ambiguous environment for ect is thus fully
described by ect ∼ (ect1, q1, ; ...;ectn, qn). Conditional to θ, the expected utility of
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an agent who purchases α zero-coupon bonds with maturity t equals
Ut(α, θ) = Eu(ectθ + αertt) = Z u(c+ αertt)dFtθ(c).
We assume that u is three times differentiable, increasing and concave, so that
U(., θ) is concave in the investment α, for all θ.
Following Klibanoff, Marinacci and Mukerji (2005) and its recursive gener-
alization (Klibanoff, Marinacci and Mukerji (2007)), we assume that the prefer-
ences of the representative agent exhibit smooth ambiguity aversion. Ex ante,
for a given investment α, the welfare of the agent is measured by Vt(α), which
is the certainty equivalent of the conditional expected utilities:
φ(Vt(α)) =
nX
θ=1
qθφ(Ut(α, θ)) =
nX
θ=1
qθφ
¡
Eu(ectθ + αertt)¢ . (1)
Function φ describes the investor’s attitude towards ambiguity (or parameter
uncertainty). It is assumed to be three times differentiable, increasing and con-
cave. A linear function φ means that the investor is neutral to ambiguity. In
such a case, the decision maker is indifferent to any mean-preserving spread of
Ut(α,eθ), and Vt(α) can be represented by a subjective expected utility func-
tional V SEUt (α) = Eu(ect + αertt). On the contrary, a concave φ is synony-
mous of ambiguity aversion in the sense that one dislikes any mean-preserving
spread of the conditional expected utility Ut(α,eθ). An interesting particular
case arises when absolute ambiguity aversion A(U) = −φ00(U)/φ0(U) is con-
stant, so that φ(U) = −A−1 exp(−AU). As proved by Klibanoff, Marinacci
and Mukerji (2005), the ex-ante welfare V (α) tends to maxmin expected utility
functional VMEUt (α) = minθ Eu(ectθ +αertt) when the degree of absolute ambi-
guity aversion φ tends to infinity. Thus, the maxmin criterion à la Gilboa and
Schmeidler (1989) is a special case of this model.
The optimal investment α∗ maximizes the intertemporal welfare of the in-
vestor, which is written as
α∗ ∈ argmax
α
u(c0 − α) + e−δtVt(α). (2)
where parameter δ is the rate of pure preference for the present. If φ and u
are strictly concave, the objective function is concave in α and the solution to
program (2), when it exists, is unique. The necessary and sufficient condition
of program (2) is written as
u0(c0 − α∗) = e−δtV 0t (α∗)
Fully differentiating equation (1) with respect to α yields
V 0t (α) = e
rtt
Pn
θ=1 qθφ
0 (Eu(ectθ + αertt))Eu0(ectθ + αertt)
φ0(Vt(α))
.
4
Because we assume that all agents have the same preferences and the same
stochastic endowment, the equilibrium condition on the market for the zero-
coupon bond associated to maturity t is α∗ = 0. Combining the above two
equations implies the following equilibrium condition:
rt = δ −
1
t
ln
∙Pn
θ=1 qθφ
0 (Eu(ectθ))Eu0(ectθ)
u0(c0)φ0(Vt(0))
¸
. (3)
This is also the socially efficient rate at which sure benefits and costs occurring
at date t must be discounted in any cost-benefit analysis at date 0.
As a benchmark, consider the case of an ambiguity neutral representa-
tive agent. In that case, we get the standard bond pricing formula rt =
δ − t−1 ln [Eu0(ect)/u0(c0)].2 In this special case, we see that the riskiness of
future consumption reduces the socially efficient discount rate if and only if
Eu0(ect) is larger than u0(Eect), i.e., if and only if u0 is convex, or if the represen-
tative agent is prudent (Leland (1968), Drèze and Modigliani (1972), Kimball
(1990)).
Our goal in this paper is to determine the conditions under which ambiguity
aversion reduces the discount rate. An ambiguous environment (ect1, q1; ...;ectn, qn)
is said to be acceptable if the supports of the ectθ are in the domain of u, and if all
Eu0(ectθ) are in the domain of φ. The set of acceptable ambiguous environments
is denoted Ψ.
3 An analytical solution
Let us consider the following specification:
• The plausible distributions of lnectθ are all normal with the same variance
σ2t, and with mean ln c0 + θt.3
• The parameter θ is normally distributed with mean μ and variance σ20.4
• The representative agent’s preferences exhibit constant relative risk aver-
sion γ = −cu00(c)/u0(c), i.e., u(c) = c1−γ/(1− γ).
• The representative agent’s preferences exhibit constant relative ambiguity
aversion η = − |u|φ00(u)/φ0(u) ≥ 0. This means that φ(U) = k(kU)1−ηk/(1−
ηk), where k = sign(1− γ) is the sign of u.
As is well-known, the Arrow-Pratt approximation is exact under CRRA and
lognormally distributed consumption. Therefore, conditional to each θ, we have
that
Eu(ectθ) = (1− γ)−1 exp(1− γ)(ln c0 + θt+ 0.5(1− γ)σ2t).
2 See for example Cochrane (2001).
3 In continuous time, this would mean that the consumption process is a geometric brownian
motion d ln ct = θdt+ σdw.
4We consider the natural continuous extension of our model with a discrete distribution
for hθ.
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We can again use the same trick to compute the φ-certainty equivalent V , since
φ(Eu(ectθ)) is an exponential function and the random variable eθ is normal,
which is another case where the Arrow-Pratt approximation is exact. It yields
Vt(0) = (1−γ)−1 exp(1−γ)(ln c0+μt+0.5(1−γ)σ2t+0.5(1−γ)(1−kη)σ20)t2).
Similarly, we have that
Eφ0 (Eu(ectθ))Eu0(ectθ) = exp−(γ + (1− γ)kη)(ln c0 + μt− 0.5(γ + (1− γ)kη)σ20t2)
×(1− γ)kη exp 0.5(γ2 − kη(1− γ)2))σ2t.
Combining these analytical expressions for the expectations in equation (3)
yields:
rt = δ + γμ−
1
2
γ2(σ2 + σ20t)−
1
2
η
¯¯
1− γ2
¯¯
σ20t. (4)
Let us define g as the expected growth rate of consumption. It is easy to check
that g = μ+0.5(σ2 + σ20t). It implies that the above equation can be rewritten
as
rt = δ + γg −
1
2
γ(γ + 1)(σ2 + σ20t)−
1
2
η
¯¯
1− γ2
¯¯
σ20t. (5)
The first two terms on the right-hand side of this equation correspond to the
classical Ramsey rule. The interest rate is increasing in the expected growth rate
of consumption g. When g is positive, decreasing marginal utility implies that
the marginal utility of consumption is expected to be smaller in the future than it
is today. This yields a positive interest rate. The third term expresses prudence.
Because the riskiness of future consumption increases the expected marginal
utility Eu0(ect) under prudence, this has a negative impact on the discount rate.5
Notice that the variance of consumption at date t equals σ2t + σ20t
2, so that
it increases at an increasing rate with respect to the time horizon. There, the
precautionary effect has a relatively larger impact on the discount rate for longer
horizons. This argument has been developed in Weitzman (2007a) and Gollier
(2007b) to justify a decreasing discount rate in an expected utility framework.
The last term in the right—hand side of equation (5) characterizes the effect
of ambiguity. Observe that it always tends to reduce the discount rate under
positive ambiguity aversion (η > 0). This effect is increasing in the degree of
ambiguity aversion η, in the degree of uncertainty σ0, and in the time horizon
t. This implies that more efforts will be made to improve the ambiguous future.
Observe, that in our example, in the absence of ambiguity (i.e. σ20 = 0), the
term structure is flat. The mere presence of ambiguity (i.e. σ20 > 0 but η = 0)
causes the rates to decrease linearly over time. Introducing ambiguity aversion
steepens this decline.
The following sections investigate whether it is true in general, that am-
biguity aversion decreases the socially efficient discount rate for any maturity.
Contrary to the example presented above, the next section reveals that ambi-
guity aversion might even decrease the willingness to save.
5This precautionary effect is equivalent to reducing the growth rate of consumption g by the
precautionary premium (Kimball (1990)) 0.5(γ+1)(σ2+σ20t). Indeed, γ+1 = −cu000(c)/u00(c)
is the index of relative prudence of the representative agent.
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4 The two effects of ambiguity aversion
In this section, we decompose the effect of the introduction of ambiguity aversion
into two components: an ambiguity prudence effect and a pessimism effect. The
benchmark is when the representative agent is neutral to ambiguity, in which
case the discount rate equals
rt = δ −
1
t
ln
∙
Eu0(ect)
u0(c0)
¸
, (6)
where ect describes future consumption, which is distributed as (ect1, q1; ...;ectn, qn).
Under ambiguity aversion, the pricing formula (3) can be rewritten in a similar
fashion as
rt = δ −
1
t
ln
"
a
Eu0(ec◦t )
u0(c0)
#
, (7)
where the constant a is defined as
a =
Pn
θ=1 qθφ
0 (Eu(ectθ))
φ0(Vt(0))
, (8)
and where ec◦t is a distorted probability distribution (ect1, q◦1 ; ...;ectn, q◦n) of future
consumption, with
q
◦
θ =
qθφ0 (Eu(ectθ))Pn
τ=1 qτφ
0 (Eu(ectτ )) , (9)
for θ = 1, ..., n. Thus, ambiguity aversion reduces the discount rate if
aEu0(ec◦t ) ≥ Eu0(ect). (10)
Notice that this condition simplifies to a ≥ 1 when the agent is risk neutral.
Because we don’t constrain the risk attitude in any way except risk aversion,
condition a ≥ 1 is necessary to guarantee that ambiguity aversion reduces the
discount rate. For reasons that will be clarified in the next section, we will refer
to a ≥ 1 as the ambiguity prudence effect.
In the absence of an ambiguity prudence effect (a = 1), condition (10) be-
comes Eu0(ec◦t ) ≥ Eu0(ect), which is referred to as the pessimism effect. At this
stage, it is enough to say that it comes from a distortion of the beliefs (q1, ..., qn)
on the likelihood of the different plausible probability distributions (ec1, ...,ecn).
5 The ambiguity prudence effect
In this section, we focus on whether the constant a defined by equation (8)
is larger than unity, which is necessary to guarantee that the discount rate is
reduced by the introduction of ambiguity aversion. This condition becomes nec-
essary and sufficient in the special case of risk-neutral consumers. Notice that,
in this special case, a can be interpreted as the sensitiveness of the φ−certainty
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equivalent of chθ = E
hecthθ | eθi to an increase in saving.6 The problem is thus to
determine whether one more dollar saved yields an increase in the φ−certainty
equivalent future consumption. More generally, condition a ≥ 1 can be rewritten
as
nX
θ=1
qθφ0 (uθ) ≥ φ0(Vt) whenever Σθqθφ(uθ) = φ(Vt). (11)
In words, do expected-utility-preserving risks raise expected marginal utility,
where the utility function referred here is the φ function? The answer to this
question is well-known in expected utility theory (see e.g. Gollier (2001, section
2.5)). This is true if and only if φ exhibits decreasing absolute aversion. Indeed,
defining function ψ such that ψ(φ(U)) = φ0(U) for all U, the above condition
can be rewritten as
nX
θ=1
qθψ (φθ) ≥ ψ(Σθqθφθ),
where φθ = φ(uθ) for all θ. This is true for all distributions of (φ1, q1; ...;φn, qn)
if and only if ψ is convex. Because ψ0(φ(U)) = φ00(U)/φ0(U), this is true iff
A(U) = −φ00(U)/φ0(U), which is the index of absolute ambiguity aversion, be
non-increasing. This proves the following results.
Lemma 1 a ≥ 1 (resp. a ≤ 1) for all acceptable ambiguous environmentsec ∈ Ψ if and only if absolute ambiguity aversion is non-increasing (resp. non-
decreasing).
Proposition 1 Suppose that the representative agent is risk neutral. The so-
cially efficient discount rate is smaller (resp. larger) than under ambiguity neu-
trality for all acceptable ambiguous environments ec ∈ Ψ if and only if φ exhibits
non increasing (resp. non decreasing) absolute ambiguity aversion.
Under risk neutrality, the driving force for the impact of ambiguity on the
interest rate is not ambiguity aversion itself, but rather whether the degree
of ambiguity aversion is increasing or decreasing with the level of conditional
expected utility U . In the limit case with risk neutrality and constant absolute
ambiguity aversion, ambiguity has no effect on the equilibrium interest rate. The
intuition of these results is easy to derive from the observation that the period-
t felicity Vt, which the certainty equivalent of the conditional expectations of
future consumption, is approximately equal to expected consumption minus the
ambiguity premium, which is proportional to ambiguity aversion A. It implies
that the willingness to save is decreasing in A0. Thus, ambiguity aversion raises
the willingness to save — and therefore reduces the equilibrium interest rate — if
absolute ambiguity aversion is decreasing.
Exactly as decreasing absolute risk aversion is unanimously accepted as a
natural assumption for risk preferences, we believe that decreasing absolute
ambiguity aversion (DAAA) is a reasonable property of uncertainty preferences.
6Define V (s, chθ) such that φ(s+V ) = Eφ(s+chθ). We have that a = ∂V (s, chθ)/∂s at s = 0.
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It means that a local mean-preserving spread in conditional expected utility has
an impact on welfare that is decreasing with the level of utility where this spread
is realized.
We call this the ambiguity prudence effect, because it emerges as a conse-
quence of the fact that the future conditional expected utility is uncertain. This
raises the willingness to save exactly as the risk on future income raises savings
in the standard expected utility model under "risk prudence". But contrary to
risk prudence which is characterized by u000 ≥ 0, ambiguity prudence is described
by decreasing absolute uncertainty aversion, which is weaker than φ000 ≥ 0. This
is because, in the intertemporal KMM model, the future felicity is represented
by the φ− certainty equivalent of the conditional expected utilities, rather than
by the expected φ− valuation of the conditional expected utilities. If we would
have used this alternative model, φ0 convex would have been the necessary and
sufficient condition to sign the ambiguity prudence effect.
However, once we allow for risk aversion, another effect emerges, and non
increasing ambiguity aversion is not sufficient anymore to unambiguously sign
the effect of ambiguity on the discount rate. This is shown by the following
counter-example.
Counter-example 1. Let c0 equal 2. We assume that ect has
two plausible distributions, ect1 ∼ (1, 1/3; 4, 1/3; 7, 1/3) and ect2 ∼
(3, 2/3; 4, 1/3). We assume that these two distributions are equally
likely to be the true one, i.e., q1 = q2 = 1/2. We assume that the
agent exhibits constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) with γ = 2,
i.e., u(c) = −c−1. We assume that the rate of pure preference
for the present δ equals zero. It is easy to check that the inter-
est rate equals 9.24% in that economy if the representative agent
would be neutral to ambiguity. Suppose alternatively that she has
constant absolute ambiguity aversion (CAAA) with A = 2.11, i.e.,
φ(U) = − exp(−2.11U). Then, tedious computations lead to the
conclusion that the socially efficient discount rate should be exactly
zero in that economy: rt = 0! Thus, this example demonstrates
that DAAA is not enough to guarantee that ambiguity about future
consumption reduces the discount rate. ¥
6 The pessimism effect
This counter-example can be explained by the presence of a second effect, the
pessimism effect. In the pricing formula (7), the expected marginal utility is
computed by using the distorted random variable ec◦t rather than the original ect.
The distortion of these implicit beliefs depends upon the degree of ambiguity
aversion and is governed by rule (9). This section is devoted to characterize how
the distortion affects the discount rate.
If this distortion is pessimistic in the sense of deteriorating the implicit dis-
tribution according to FSD, this pessimism effect would go with the prudence
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effect to reduce the socially efficient discount rate. To examine this specific ques-
tion, we begin with the comparison of the distorted probabilities q
◦
= (q
◦
1 , ..., q
◦
n)
to the original probabilities q = (q1, ..., qn).
Suppose that priors are ranked in such a way that Eu(ect1) ≤ Eu(ect2) ≤ ... ≤
Eu(ectn), i.e. in such a way that the agent always prefers a larger θ. We hereafter
show that ambiguity aversion is equivalent to a distortion of the prior belief on
parameter eθ in the sense of the Monotone Likelihood Ratio Order (MLR). By
definition, a shift of beliefs from q to q
◦
entails a deterioration in the sense of the
monotone likelihood ratio ordering (MLR) if q◦hθ/qhθ and θ˜ are anti-comonotonic.
Observe from (9) that q◦θ/qθ is proportional to φ
0(Eu(ectθ)). Thus, since φ0 is
decreasing, we know that q◦hθ/qhθ and E
h
u(ect) | eθi are anti-comonotonic. By
transitivity, we can state the following.
Lemma 2 The subsequent conditions are equivalent:
Corollary 1 1. Beliefs q◦ are dominated by q in the sense of the monotone
likelihood ratio order for any set of marginals (ect1, ...,ectn) such that Eu(ect1) ≤
Eu(ect2) ≤ ... ≤ Eu(ectn).
2. φ is concave.
This result has a very intuitive interpretation. Ambiguity aversion is char-
acterized by an MLR-dominated shift in the prior beliefs. In other words, it
biases beliefs by favoring the worse marginals in a very specific sense: if the
agent prefers marginal ectθ to marginal ectθ0 , then, the ambiguity-averse represen-
tative agent increases the implicit prior probability q◦θ relatively more than the
implicit prior probability q◦θ 0. This gives some flesh to our terminology in which
we refer to a pessimism effect for the distortion of implicit beliefs. This result
generalizes — and build a bridge with — the maxmin case where all the weight is
transferred to the worse θ.
Intuitively, this worsening of the future risk should induce the representative
consumer to raise his saving. However, the MLR deterioration in the distributioneθ of the priors is not enough to ensure an unambiguously negative pessimism
effect on the socially efficient discount rate, as counterexample 1 tells us. This
would require that the probability distortion raises the unconditional expected
marginal utility, which would be the case if it would overweight the scenarios
that yield the larger conditional expected marginal utility. The above lemma
says something different: it states that the probability distortion overweight the
scenarios that yield the smaller expected utility. To solve this problem, we need
that the conditional Eu and Eu0 be ranked in opposite directions.
Lemma 3 The following two conditions are equivalent:
1. The pessimism effect reduces the discount rate, i.e. Eu0(ec◦t ) ≥ Eu0(ect), for
all φ increasing and concave;
2. E
h
u(ect) | eθi and E hu0(ectθ) | eθi are anti-comonotonic.
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Proof : To prove that 2 ⇒ 1, suppose that E
h
u(ect) | eθi and E hu0(ectθ) | eθi
be anti-comonotonic. Since φ0 is decreasing, our assumption implies that φ0(E
h
u(ect) | eθi)
and E
h
u0(ectθ) | eθi are comonotonic. By the covariance rule, it implies that
Eu0(ec◦t ) = Pnθ=1 qθφ0 (Eu(ectθ))Eu0(ectθ)Pn
θ=1 qθφ
0 (Eu(ectθ))
≥
£Pn
θ=1 qθφ
0 (Eu(ectθ))¤ [Pnθ=1 qθEu0(ectθ)]Pn
θ=1 qθφ
0 (Eu(ectθ))
=
nX
θ=1
qθEu0(ectθ) = Eu0(ect),
In order to prove that 1 =⇒ 2, suppose by contradiction that Eu(ect1) <
Eu(ect2) < ... < Eu(ectn), but there exists θ ∈ [1, n − 1] such that Eu0(ectθ) ≤
Eu0(ectθ+1). Then, consider any increasing and concave φ that is locally linear
for all U ≤ Eu(ectθ) and for all U ≥ Eu(ectθ+1), and has a strictly negative
derivative in between these bounds. For any such function φ, we have that
φ0(E
h
u(ect) | eθi) and E hu0(ectθ) | eθi are anti-comonotonic. Using the covariance
rule as above, that implies that Eu0(ec◦t ) < Eu0(ect), a contradiction. ¥
It seems natural that if u is increasing and u0 is decreasing, their expec-
tations should rank lotteries in opposite direction. The theory of stochastic
dominance tells us that this is not so easy! We are looking for families of lotter-
ies (ect1, ...,ectn) and families of utility functions u such that u and −u0 “agree”
on a ranking of these lotteries. The simplest case is when (ect1, ...,ectn) can be
ranked according to first-degree stochastic dominance (FSD), i.e. when Ef(ectθ)
is increasing in θ for all increasing functions f . Taking f = u and f = −u0, two
increasing functions, directly implies that condition 2 in Lemma 3 is satisfied
under that condition. However, ranking the priors according to FSD is quite
restrictive, so it would be better to extend this result to a weaker stochastic
order, as the second-degree stochastic dominance order (SSD). This means that
Ef(ectθ) is increasing in θ for all increasing and concave functions f. If we assume
that u has a convex derivative, that is, assuming that the representative agent
is prudent, implies that f = −u0 is increasing and concave. Thus, condition 2 in
Lemma 3 is again satisfied in that case. This yields the following proposition.
Proposition 2 The pessimism effect reduces the socially efficient discount rate
if
• The set of marginals (ect1, ...,ectn) can be ranked according to FSD.
• The set of marginals (ect1, ...,ectn) can be ranked according to SSD and u
exhibits prudence.
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The second sufficient condition relax the constraint on the structure of the
ambiguity, but it constrains the set of acceptable risk attitudes which must
satisfy prudence in addition to risk aversion. In the absence of ambiguity, being
prudent means that the agent would like to save more if a zero-mean risk is
added to her wealth (Leland (1968), Drèze and Modigliani (1972)).
In the following proposition, we propose a third pair of sufficient conditions.
Compared to the SSD/prudence condition, this third pair relax the condition
that the priors must be ranked according to SSD, but it is more restrictive on
the set of acceptable utility function, since prudence is replaced by the stronger
DARA condition. We use a stochastic order introduced by Jewitt (1989).
Definition 1 We say that ecθ0 dominates ecθ in the sense of Jewitt if the following
condition is satisfied: for all increasing and concave u, if agent u prefers ecθ0 toecθ, then all agents more risk-averse than u also prefer ecθ0 to ecθ.
Of course, from the definition itself, if ecθ0 dominates ecθ in the sense of SSD,
this preference order also holds in the sense of Jewitt, thereby showing that this
order is weaker than SSD. Jewitt (1989) shows that distribution function Ftθ0
dominates Ftθ in the sense of Jewitt if and only if the following condition holds:
there exists some w in their joint support [a, b], such thatZ x
a
(Ftθ0(z)− Ftθ(z))dz ≥ 0 for all x ∈ [a,w], (12)Z w
a
(Ftθ0(z)− Ftθ(z))dz = 0 (13)Z x
a
(Ftθ0(z)− Ftθ(z))dz is non-increasing on [w, b]. (14)
Two random variables fulfill Definition ?? if there exists a consumption level
w in their support such that, conditional on the outcome being lower than w,
Ftθ0 dominates Ftθ in the sense of SSD, whereas conditional on the outcome
being higher than w, Ftθ0 dominates Ftθ in the sense of FSD. Observe that
second-degree stochastic dominance is indeed stronger than Jewitt’s ordering,
since SSD is contained in Definition ?? as a special case when we pick w = b.
Proposition 3 The pessimism effect reduces the socially efficient discount rate
if the set of marginals (ect1, ...,ectn) can be ranked according to Jewitt’s stochastic
order and u exhibits decreasing absolute risk aversion.
Proof : Decreasing absolute risk aversion means that v = −u0 is more con-
cave than u in the sense of Arrow-Pratt. By definition of the Jewitt’s stochastic
order, it implies that Eu(ectθ0) ≥ Eu(ectθ) implies that Ev(ectθ0) ≥ Ev(ectθ), or
equivalently, that Eu0(ectθ0) ≤ Eu0(ectθ). Thus Eu and Eu0 are anti-comonotonic.
Using Lemma 3 concludes the proof. ¥
Combing Lemma 1 with Propositions 2 and 3 yields our main result.
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Proposition 4 Suppose that the representative agent exhibits non increasing
absolute ambiguity aversion (DAAA). Then, ambiguity aversion reduces the so-
cially efficient discount rate if one of the following conditions holds:
1. The set of marginals (ect1, ...,ectn) can be ranked according to FSD and u is
increasing and concave.
2. The set of marginals (ect1, ...,ectn) can be ranked according to SSD and u is
increasing, concave, and exhibits prudence.
3. The set of marginals (ect1, ...,ectn) can be ranked according to Jewitt (1989)
and u is increasing and concave, and exhibits DARA.
Observe that the result in our analytical example in Section 3 fits into condi-
tion 1. A mere translation in the distribution constitutes a first-degree stochas-
tic dominance. Yet, in many circumstances, the degrees of riskiness also differ
across the plausible distributions, usually implying that the plausible prior dis-
tributions cannot be ranked according to FSD. Condition 2 provides a sufficient
condition on risk attitudes if marginals can only be ranked according to second-
degree stochastic dominance, which contains Rothschild-Stiglitz’s increases in
risk as a particular case. It turns out that in this case, in addition to risk-
aversion, the representative agent should also be prudent. Note that even the
weaker Jewitt-ordering from 3 only requires decreasing absolute risk aversion.
This property is widely accepted in the economic literature and it is in particu-
lar compatible with the observation that more wealthy individuals tend to take
more portfolio risk.7
7 The comparative statics of an increase in am-
biguity aversion
Our results up to now characterize the effect of smooth ambiguity aversion on
the equilibrium interest rate, starting from the ambiguity-neutral benchmark.
This section is devoted to characterizing the effect of any increase in ambiguity
aversion. For this purpose, consider two economies, i = 1, 2, which are identical
up to the level of ambiguity aversion of the respective representative agent. In
particular, suppose that the one in economy 2 is more ambiguity-averse, which
means that φ2(U) = k(φ1(U)) for all U , with k(·) increasing and concave. Ac-
cording to the adjusted pricing formula in (7) an increase in ambiguity aversion
decreases the social discount rate if and only if
a2Eu0(c˜2t ) ≥ a1Eu0(c˜1t ), (15)
7Notice that counter-example 1, the two random variables hct1 and hct2 cannot be ranked
according to SSD. This is why we obtain that ambiguity aversion raises the interest rate in
spite of the fact that u0(c) = c−2 is convex.
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where ai is defined as in (8) with φ being replaced by φi, and where c˜it is the
implicit consumption distorted by weights qiθ, as in (9). Naturally, taking φ1
linear, we retrieve condition (10) from the SEU benchmark.
At the outset, we are able to generalize our findings about the pessimism
effect to any increase in ambiguity aversion.
Lemma 4 The following two conditions are equivalent:
1. Beliefs q2 are dominated by q1 in the sense of the monotone likelihood
ratio order for any set of marginals (ect1, ...,ectn) such that Eu(ect1) ≤ ... ≤
Eu(ectn).
2. φ2 = k(φ1) is more ambiguity-averse than φ1, meaning that k is increasing
and concave.
Proof : Note that we need to find that q2hθ/q
1
hθ and θ˜ are anti-comonotonic.
Using (9), we can rewrite the ratio as
q2θ
q1θ
= k0 (φ1(Eu(ectθ)))Pnτ=1 qτφ01 (Eu(ectτ ))Pn
τ=1 qτφ
0
2 (Eu(ectτ )) .
The fraction on the right hand side does not change with θ. Furthermore, k0
is decreasing in its argument. Finally, since the argument φ1(Eu(ectθ)) is itself
increasing with θ by assumption, we get the desired result. ¥
This implies that under the stochastic order conditions of Proposition 4,
more ambiguity aversion reinforces the pessimism effect, thereby tending to
reduce the interest rate. However, it is clear from section 5 that an increase of
ambiguity aversion has an ambiguous impact on the ambiguity prudence effect,
i.e., on ai. In particular, introducing increasing absolute ambiguity aversion
will rather raise the interest rate if the representative agent is risk neutral. For
small degrees of ambiguity, the impact of a change in φ on a depends upon its
impact of the speed at which absolute ambiguity aversion decreases, as stated
in the following lemma.
Lemma 5 Consider a family of ambiguous environment parametrized by k ∈ R
and a vector (u1, ..., un) ∈ Rn such that Eu(ectθ(k)) = u0 + kuθ for all θ. Let us
define a(k) = Σθqθφ0(Eu(ectθ(k)))/φ0(V (k)), where φ(V (k)) = Σθqθφ(Eu(ectθ(k))).
We have that
a(k) = 1− 1
2
V ar(kuhθ)
∂
∂u0
µ
−φ00(u0)
φ0(u0)
¶
+ o(k2), (16)
where limk→0 o(k2)/k2 = 0.
Proof: Observe first that V (0) = u0, V 0(0) = Euhθ, and V
00(0) = V ar(uhθ)φ
00(u0)/φ0(u0).
Notice also that a(0) = 0. We have in turn that
a0(k) =
E
£
uhθφ
00(u0 + kuhθ)
¤
φ0(V (k))−E
£
φ0(u0 + kuhθ)
¤
φ00(V (k))V 0(k)¡
φ0(V (k)
¢2 .
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It implies that a0(0) = 0. Differentiating again the above equality at k = 0
yields
φ00
2a00(0) = E
h
u2hθ
i
φ00φ
000
0 +
¡
Euhθ
¢2 φ0020 − ¡Euhθ¢2 φ0020 − ¡Euhθ¢2 φ00φ0000 − φ00φ000V 00(0)
=
³
E
h
u2hθ
i
−
¡
Euhθ
¢2´ ¡φ00φ0000 − φ0020 ¢ ,
where φ(i)0 = φ
(i)(u0). This implies that
a00(0) = −V ar(uhθ)
∂
∂u0
µ
−φ00(u0)
φ0(u0)
¶
.
The Taylor expansion of a yields a(k) = a(0) + ka0(0) + 0.5k2a00(0) + o(k2).
Collecting the successive derivatives of a above concludes the proof. ¥
A direct consequence of the above lemma is that, for small degrees of ambi-
guity, a2 is larger than a1 if and only if
∂
∂u0
µ
−φ002(u0)
φ02(u0)
¶
≥ ∂
∂u0
µ
−φ001(u0)
φ01(u0)
¶
, (17)
i.e., if absolute ambiguity aversion decreases more rapidly under φ2 than under
φ1, locally at the ambiguity-free expected utility level u0. Thus, for small degrees
of ambiguity, a change in the attitude towards ambiguity from φ1 to φ2 yields
an ambiguity prudence effect that tends to reduce the interest rate if condition
(17) is satisfied.
Unfortunately, it is not true in general that condition (17) for all u0 is
sufficient for a2 ≥ a1 for all ambiguous environments. To show this, let us
consider the following counter-example.
Counter-example 2. Let φ(U) = U1−η/(1 − η) defined on R+.
Observe that −φ00(U)/φ0(U) = η/U is positive and decreasing in
its domain. Moreover, an increase in η raises ambiguity aversion,
and the speed at which absolute ambiguity aversion decreases with
U . From Proposition 5, it implies that a is increasing in η when
the risk on U is small. We show that this is not true for large
degrees of ambiguity. Suppose that u(c) = c and that there are
n = 2 equally likely plausible probability distributions, with c1 = 0.5
and c2 = 1.5. Suppose also that δ = 0.25. In Figure 1, we draw
the socially efficient discount rate rt for t = 1 as a function of the
degree of relative ambiguity aversion η. As stated in Proposition
1, we see that the discount rate r1(η) under ambiguity aversion is
always smaller than under ambiguity neutrality (r(0)). However, the
relationship between the discount rate and the degree of ambiguity
aversion is not monotone. For example, increasing relative ambiguity
aversion from η = 3 to any larger level raises the discount rate.
With a counter-example based on the most common family of utility func-
tions φ(U) = U1−η/(1 − η), there is no hope to get convincing sufficient con-
ditions to guarantee that a marginal change in the attitude towards ambiguity
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Figure 1: The discount rate as a function of relative ambiguity aversion. We
assume that φ(U) = U1−η/(1 − η), u(c) = c, δ = 0.25, c1 = 0.5, c2 = 1.5 and
p = 0.5.
raises savings and reduces the equilibrium interest rate. We are left with three
strategies to sign its effect on a:
• The degree of ambiguity aversion is small and condition (17) is satisfied;
• The initial degree of ambiguity aversion is small, so that Proposition 1
can be used as an approximation;
• The initial φ1 function exhibits non decreasing ambiguity aversion, whereas
the final φ2 function exhibits non increasing ambiguity aversion. This im-
plies that a1 ≤ 1 ≤ a2.
Any of these three conditions is sufficient to obtain that a2 is larger than a1.
Combining it with any of the three conditions of Proposition 4 is sufficient to
guarantee that a marginal increase in ambiguity aversion reduces the socially
efficient discount rate.
8 Numerical illustrations
8.1 The power-power normal-normal case
As observed in Section 3, we can solve analytically for the socially efficient
discount rate by taking a “power-power” specification. That is, CRRA risk
preferences and CRAA ambiguity preferences allow for an exact solution if both
ambiguity and the logarithm of consumption are normally distributed. In accor-
dance with Weitzman (2007b) who considered a similar model under ambiguity
neutrality, we will establish the following parameter values as a benchmark.
Consider a "quartet of twos". Namely a rate of pure preference for the present
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δ = 2%, a degree of relative risk aversion γ = 2, a mean growth rate of con-
sumption g = 2%, and standard deviation of growth σ = 2%. We can rewrite
the Ramsey rule 5 as
rt = 5.88%− 3σ20t(1 + η/2). (18)
Hence, in the absence of ambiguity, the Ramsey rule prescribes a flat discount
rate of 5.88%. We introduce ambiguity by assuming that the growth-trend
has a normal distribution with standard deviation σ0 = 1%. In other words,
consumers believe that with a 95% probability, the growth trend lies between 0%
and 4%. Even in the absence of ambiguity aversion (η = 0), the introduction of
ambiguous probabilities affects the term structure of discount rates, as shown by
Weitzman (2007a) and Gollier (2007b). This is due to the fatter tails that this
ambiguity yields for the distribution of future consumption. Indeed, ambiguity
increases the volatility of log-consumption at date t by σ20t2. Accordingly, the
prudent agent wants to save more for more distant futures, and the interest rate
should fall with the time-horizon.
If in addition the agent exhibits ambiguity aversion, the social discount rate
decreases more quickly, as seen from equation (18). Ambiguity aversion has no
effect on the short term interest rate in this specification.
In order to calibrate the model, one needs to evaluate the degree of relative
ambiguity aversion η. To do this, let us consider the following thought experi-
ment.8 Suppose that the growth rate of the economy over the next 10 years is
either 20% with probability π, otherwise it equals 0%. Suppose that the true
value of π is unknown. Rather, it is uniformly distributed on [0, 1], as in the
Ellsberg game in which the player has no information about the proportion of
black and white balls in the urn. Let us define the certainty equivalent growth
rate CE(η) as the sure growth rate of the economy that yields the same wel-
fare than in the ambiguous risky environment described above. It is implicitly
defined by the following condition:µ
k
(1 + CE)1−γ
1− γ
¶1−kη
=
Z 1
0
µ
k
µ
π
1.21−γ
1− γ + (1− π)
11−γ
1− γ
¶¶1−kη
dπ,
where γ is set at γ = 2. In Figure 2, we have drawn the certainty equivalent
as a function of the degree of relative ambiguity aversion. In the absence of
ambiguity aversion (or if π is known to be equal to 50%), the certainty equivalent
growth rate equals CE(0) = 9.1%. Surveying experimental studies based on the
Ellsberg game, Camerer (1999) reports ambiguity premia CE(0)−CE(η) that
are in the order of magnitude of 10% of the expected of the expected value in this
kind of Ellsberg-style uncertainty. In this environment, this yields a reasonable
ambiguity premium of 10% of 10%, i.e., a 1% reduction in the growth rate. Thus,
ambiguity aversion should reduce the certainty equivalent to 9.1% to around 8%.
From Figure 2, this is compatible with a degree of relative ambiguity aversion
between η = 5 and η = 10.
8 It is based on a 10-year version of the calibration exercice performed by Collard, Mukerji,
Sheppard and Tallon (2008), who considered a power-exponential specification.
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Figure 2: The certainty equivalent growth rate CE (in %) as a function of
relative ambiguity aversion η. We assume that the growth rate is either 20% or
0% respectively with probability π and 1 − π, with π ∼ U(0, 1). Relative risk
aversion equals γ = 2.
Table 1 reports the values of efficient rates for projects with maturity 10 and
30 respectively.
Table 1: The social discount rate at the benchmark “quartet of twos”, with
σ0 = 1%.
t η = 0 η = 5 η = 10
10 5.58% 4.83% 4.08%
30 4.98% 2.73% 0.48%
Whereas the ambiguity aversion has no effect on the short term interest
rate, its effect on the long rate is important. The discount rate for a cash flow
occurring in 30 years is reduced from 4.98% to 2.73% when relative ambiguity
aversion goes from η = 0 to η = 5.
The discrepancies between the settings call for an empirical separation be-
tween standard risk and ambiguity in an economy. While the former shifts the
level of the yield curve, the latter determines its slope. A negative slope tends
to increase the relative importance of long-term costs and benefits. We want to
stress here the amplification potential of ambiguity aversion for the evaluation
of long-term projects.
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8.2 An AR(1) process for log consumption with an am-
biguous long term trend
Clearly, while delivering simple expressions, our benchmark economy ab-
stracts from rich consumption dynamics, notably any serial correlation. It is
thus not surprising that our predictions do not fare well when confronted with
the term structure of interest rates observed on financial markets. Thus, we will
relax the assumption of uncorrelated growth rates and allow for persistence of
shocks, as in Collard, Mukerji, Sheppard and Tallon (2008) and Gollier (2008).
We hereafter show that this model can produce the desired non-linear term
structure in the short run and the medium run. Still, in the limit, the model
generates a linearly decreasing term structure in the long run.
Consider first an auto-regressive consumption process of order 1 à la
Vasicek (1977), but in which the long term growth μ of log consumption around
which the actual growth mean-reverts is uncertain:
ln ct+1 = ln ct + xt
xt = ξxt−1 + (1− ξ)μ+ εt
εt ∼ N(0, σ2), εt ⊥ εt0
μ ∼ N(μ0, σ20), (19)
where 0 ≤ ξ ≤ 1. That is, system (19) describes an AR(1) consumption process
with unknown trend. The polar case without persistence (ξ = 0), amounts to
the discrete time equivalent of the geometric Brownian motion considered in
Section 3 and calibrated here above. In contrast, ξ = 1 describes shocks on the
growth of log consumption that are fully persistent. We can follow the same
lines as we did to obtain equation (4) to obtain the following generalization:
rt = δ+γ
EXt
t
−1
2
γ2
V ar [Xt | μ] + V ar [E[Xt | μ]]
t
−1
2
η
¯¯
1− γ2
¯¯ V ar [E[Xt | μ]]
t
,
(20)
where Xt is defined as
Xt = ln ct − ln c0 = μt+ (x−1 − μ)
ξ(1− ξt)
1− ξ +
tX
τ=1
1− ξτ
1− ξ εt−τ .
It yields
EXt
t
= μ0 + (x−1 − μ0)
ξ(1− ξt)
t(1− ξ) ,
V ar [Xt | μ]
t
=
σ2
(1− ξ)2 + σ
2 ξ(1− ξt)
t(1− ξ)3
∙
ξ(1 + ξt)
1 + ξ
− 2
¸
,
and
V ar [E[Xt | μ]]
t
=
σ20
t
µ
t− ξ(1− ξ
t)
1− ξ
¶2
.
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Figure 3: The term structure of discount rates in the case of an AR(1) with an
ambiguous long term trend, with δ = 2%, γ = 2, μ0 = 2%, σ = 2%, σ0 = 1%,
x−1 = 1%, and ξ = 0.7.
To illustrate, suppose that δ = 2%, γ = 2, μ0 = 2%, σ = 2%, σ0 = 1%,and
x−1 = 1%. Following Backus, Foresi and Telmer (1998) for example, suppose
also that ξ = 0.7 year−1, such that a shock has a half-life of 3.2 years. In
Figure 3, we have drawn the term structure of discount rates for 3 different
degrees of ambiguity aversion: η = 0, 5, and 10. We can see that, as in the
absence of persistence, the role of ambiguity aversion is to force a downward
slope of the yield curve for long time horizons. This is confirmed by the following
observation:
lim
t→∞
∂rt
∂t
= −1
2
η
¯¯
1− γ2
¯¯
σ20.
8.3 An AR(1) process for log consumption with an am-
biguous degree of mean reversion
Consider alternatively an auto-regressive consumption process of order 1
with a known long term trend, but in which there is some ambiguity about the
coefficient of mean reversion:
ln ct+1 = ln ct + xt
xt = ξxt−1 + (1− ξ)μ+ εt
εt ∼ N(0, σ2), εt ⊥ εt0
ξ ∼ U(ξ, ξ).
There is no analytical solution for the discount rate, which must be computed
numerically by estimating the following two terms that appear in equation (3)
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Figure 4: The term structure of discount rates in the case of an AR(1) with an
ambiguous mean reversion coefficient, with δ = 2%, γ = 2, μ = 2%, σ = 2%,
x−1 = 1%, and ξ ∼ U(0.5, 0.9).
(we normalized c0 = 1):
Eφ0 (Eu)Eu0
u0(c0)
= bE exp
µ
−(γ + kη(1− γ))E [Xt | ξ] + 1
2
¡
γ2 − kη(1− γ)2
¢
V ar [Xt | ξ]
¶
φ0(Vt(0)) = b
µ
E exp
µ
(1− kη)(1− γ)E [Xt | ξ] + 1
2
(1− kη)(1− γ)2V ar [Xt | ξ]
¶¶ −kη
1−kη
.
In Figure 4 we draw the term structure of the discount rate with the same
parameter values as in the previous section, except that μ = 2% and ξ ∼
U(0.5, 0.9). As before, longer time horizons yields more ambiguity in the set of
plausible distributions of consumption, which implies that ambiguity aversion
has a stronger negative impact on the discount rates associated to these longer
durations.
9 Conclusion
The present paper has shown how ambiguity-aversion changes the way one
should discount future costs and benefits of investment projects. In line with
recent literature, our analysis suggests that parameter uncertainty might well
be decisive in long-term policy appraisals. Nevertheless, we found that, in gen-
eral, it is not true that ambiguity aversion always decreases the socially effi-
cient discount rate. We have, however, identified moderate requirements on
risk-attitudes and the statistical relation among prior distributions, such that
decreasing ambiguity aversion should induce us to use a smaller discount rate.
Our numerical illustrations indicate that the effect of ambiguity aversion on the
discount rate is large, in particular for longer time horizons.
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